HE 


GIFT  OF 


GIFT 

MAR   1    1913 


SOME  OFTEN   OVERLOOKED 

POINTS  REGARDING  GOVERNMENT 

OWNERSHIP  OF  RAILWAYS 


ADDRESS 


delivered  by 


MR.  SAMUEL  O.  DUNN 

Editor  of  the  Railway  Age  Gazette 


before  the 


TRAFFIC  CLUB  OF  NEW  ENGLAND 


BOSTON,  MASS. 


DECEMBER  6,  1912 


SOME  OFTEN   OVERLOOKED 

POINTS  REGARDING  GOVERNMENT 

OWNERSHIP  OF  RAILWAYS 


ADDRESS 


delivered  by 


MR.  SAMUEL  O.  DUNN 

Editor  of  the  Railway  Age  Gazette 


before  the 


TRAFFIC  CLUB  OF  NEW  ENGLAND 


BOSTON,  MASS. 


DECEMBER  6,  1912 


SOME  OFTEN  OVERLOOKED  POINTS  REGARDING 
GOVERNMENT  OWNERSHIP. 

BY  SAMUEL,  0.  DUNN, 
Editor  of  the  Railway  Age  Gazette. 

At  intervals  for  a  long  time  different  men  whose  views 
are  of  great  weight  have  said  that  unless  certain  things 
were  done,  or  others  ceased  to  be  done,  in  the  United 
States  government  acquisition  and  operation  of  the  rail- 
ways would  result.  William  J.  Bryan,  on  returning  in 
1906  from  a  trip  around  the  world,  made  a  famous  speech 
at  Madison  Square  Garden,  New  York  City,  in  which  he 
announced  himself  in  favor  of  government  ownership  of 
railroads.  He  believed  that  "  railroads  partake  so  much 
of  the  nature  of  a  monopoly  that  they  must  ultimately 
become  public  property  and  be  managed  by  public  officials 
in  the  interest  of  the  whole  community."  Mr.  Bryan's 
views  were  unanimously  criticized  and  denounced  by  the 
Republican  press;  they  met  dissent  and  condemnation 
from  most  of  the  Democratic  press ;  and  it  soon  was  evi- 
dent that  the  press  reflected  public  opinion.  Mr.  Bryan 
himself  was  so  convinced  of  this  that  when  in  1908  he 
was  nominated  by  the  Democrats  for  president  he  said 
that  he  did  not  consider  government  ownership  an  issue 
in  the  impending  campaign.  But  his  opponents  used  his 
pronouncement  against  him;  he  was  beaten;  and  doubt- 
less it  helped  in  his  defeat. 

No  prominent  American  public  man  has  since  advo- 
cated government  ownership  of  railways.  But  there  are 
many  students  of  the  railway  problem,  and  many  keen 
observers  of  public  affairs,  who  doubt  if  this  incident 

257208 


meant  much.  Mr.  Bryan's  speech  was  ill-timed.  The 
Hepburn  act,  giving  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion Jargely  increased  power,  had  just  gone  into  effect; 
ancTboth  those  who  had  little  and  those  who  had  much 
faith  in  the  new  policy  of  regulation  were  disposed  to 
grant  it  a  fair  trial.  Nor  was  Mr.  Bryan's  plan  such 
as  strongly  to  attract  even  the  friends  of  government 
ownership.  Out  of  deference  to  the  state's  rights  tradi- 
tions of  his  party  he  suggested  that  the  states  acquire  and 
operate  the  branch  lines  and  the  nation  the  main  lines. 
Most  of  those  who  favored  government  ownership  in  prin- 
ciple saw  that  this  scheme  would  be  unworkable  in  prac- 
tice. 

W.  M.  Acworth,  the  English  authority  on  railway 
economics — best-informed  and  keenest  of  foreign  students 
of  American  railways — believes  that  the  United  States 
"will  get  much  nearer  to  the  brink  of  nationalization  than 
they  have  come  at  present  and  will  then  start  back  on  the 
edge  of  the  precipice  and  escape  by  some  road  not  yet 
discernible."1 

Doubtless  some  advocates  of  increased  government  reg- 
ulation have  predicted  that  if  the  policies  they  favored 
were  not  adopted  government  ownership  would  result,  not 
so  much  because  they  believed  this,  as  because  they  wished 
to  frighten  those  who  opposed  them.  Doubtless,  also, 
some  who  have  opposed  certain  increases  of  government 
regulation  have  said  that,  if  adopted,  they  would  lead  to 
government  ownership,  not  so  much  because  they  believed 
this  as  because  they  wished  to  prevent  the  additional 
regulation.  But  unquestionably  there  are  many  keen  and 
foresightful  students  of  passing  events,  some  of  whom 
are  against  government  ownership,  and  some  of  whom 

Bulletin  of  the  International  Railway  Congress  for  August,  1911. 


favor  it,  who  are  convinced  that  we  are  moving  toward 
it.  This  being  the  case  it  is  desirable  that  so  far  as  the 
question  is  considered  it  shall  be  considered  on  its  merits. 
No  question  can  be  thus  considered  when  there  are  prev- 
alent serious  misconceptions  regarding  the  facts  bearing 
on  it.  There  are  a  number  of  such  misconceptions  prev- 
alent regarding  the  question  of  government  ownership  as 
it  presents  itself  to  us  in  this  country;  and  it  is  to  some 
of  them  that  I  intend  to  address  myself. 

THE  EXTENT  OF  GOVEBNMENT  OWNERSHIP. 

For  example,  because  of  the  number  of  countries  which 
within  the  last  half  century  have  adopted  government 
ownership  there  is  an  impression  that  it  has  become  the 
prevalent  railway  policy  of  the  world,  or  at  least  that  of 
most  of  the  leading  nations.  In  point  of  mileage  of  line, 
however,  the  railways  owned  by  companies  still  greatly 
exceeds  the  mileage  owned  by  states.  In  1910  the  total 
mileage  of  line  in  the  world  was  638,611  miles ;  and  of  this 
187,952  miles,  or  only  29.43  per  cent.,  was  owned  by  states 
and  450,659  miles,  or  70.57  per  cent,  by  companies.1  The 
bulk  of  the  company-owned  mileage  is  in  the  United 
States,  the  mileage  of  this  country  being  240,667  miles  in 
1910,  when  tlie  Arcliiv  fur  EisenbaJinwesen  made  its  most 
recent  compilation  of  the  world 's  railway  mileage;  but 
the  privately-owned  mileage  in  other  countries  at  that 
time  was  209,992  miles,  or  22,040  miles  greater  than  the 
total  state-owned  mileage.  Some  lines  owned  by  com- 
panies are  operated  by  the  states,  and  some  lines  owned 
by  governments  are  leased  to  companies;  but  the  pro- 
portion of  state-operated  to  company-operated  mileage  is 

lArcMv  fur  EisenbaJmwesen,  May  and  June,  1912. 


about  the  same  as  the  proportion  of  state-owned  to  com- 
pany-owned mileage. 

Nor  does  it  give  a  correct  idea  to  say  that  government 
ownership  has  been  adopted  by  most  leading  countries. 
Germany  has  adopted  it;  but  Great  Britain  adheres  to 
private  ownership.  Most  of  the  railways  of  Austria- 
Hungary  are  state-operated,  but  most  of  those  of  France 
are  still  in  private  hands.  Most  of  the  railways  of  Italy 
and  Eussia  are  state-operated,  but  in  the  principal  coun- 
try of  South  America,  Argentina,  with  a  mileage  greater 
than  that  of  Italy,  and  in  Canada,  with  a  large  and  rap- 
idly increasing  mileage,  private  ownership  is  greatly  pre- 
ponderant. Japan  is  committed  to  government  owner- 
ship, but  in  the  United  States,  with  a  mileage  exceeding 
that  of  the  combined  state-owned  railways  of  all  the 
world,  private  management  is  the  exclusive  policy. 

In  Belgium,  Finland,  Denmark,  Switzerland,  Norway, 
Bulgaria,  Servia,  Eoumania,  Egypt,  Honduras,  Siam, 
Newfoundland,  Australasia,  Ceylon,  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
Natal,  Orange  Eiver  Colony  and  Transvaal,  British  East 
Africa,  Northern  and  Southern  Nigeria,  Gold  Coast, 
Sierra  Leone,  the  Federated  Malay  States,  Jamaica  and 
Mauritius,  government  ownership  and  operation  are  the 
preponderant  policy.  In  Sweden,  Portugal,  Spain,  Tur- 
key, Greece,  Algeria,  Tunis,  Brazil,  Paraguay,  Uruguay, 
Cuba,  China,  Ehodesia,  and  British  Guiana  private  own- 
ership and  operation  preponderate.  In  Chile  the  mile- 
ages of  the  state  and  private  lines  are  about  equal.  In 
Holland  most  of  the  mileage  is  owned  by  the  state,  but 
all  of  it  is  operated  by  private  companies.  In  Peru,  as  in 
Holland,  most  of  the  mileage  is  state-owned,  but  all  is 
privately-managed.  In  India  most  of  the  mileage  is  state- 
owned,  but  most  of  it  is  operated  by  companies.  In  Mex- 


ico  private  companies  built  all  the  lines  and  still  operate 
them,  but  the  state  has  acquired  a  controlling  part  of  the 
companies'  stock.  The  railways  of  Nicaragua  and  Guate- 
mala are  state-owned ;  but  they  are  leased  to  and  operated 
by  private  companies. 

The  foregoing  shows  there  is  great  diversity  in  the 
railway  policies  of  different  countries.  There  is  often  no 
want  of  variety  in  the  same  country.  In  only  a  few  do 
public  ownership  and  operation  obtain  exclusively;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  seldom  have  ownership  and  operation 
been  remitted  wholly  to  private  hands.  In  some  countries 
there  is  private  operation  of  publicly-owned  lines,  in  oth- 
ers public  operation  of  privately-owned  lines;  and  occa- 
sionally— in  Austria  for  example — there  are  found  side 
by  side  public  operation  of  state-owned  lines,  private 
operation  of  privately-owned  lines,  state  operation  of 
privately-owned  lines,  and  private  operation  of  state- 
owned  lines. 

CONDITIONS  LEADING  TO  GOVERNMENT  OWNERSHIP  IN 
OTHER  COUNTRIES. 

Another  of  the  misconceptions  prevalent  is  that  the 
same  conditions  and  arguments  that  converted  the  people 
of  other  countries  to  government  ownership  exist,  and  are 
applicable,  here.  This  is  very  far  from  the  fact.  Univer- 
sally where  government  ownership  obtains  the  conditions 
preceding  and  surrounding  its  adoption  were  quite  unlike 
past  and  present  conditions  here. 

In  the  first  place,  in  the  United  States  legislation  sel- 
dom has  anticipated  and  provided  means  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  railways  by  either  the  states  or  the  nation. 
Their  franchises  usually  have  been  granted  practically  in 
perpetuity.  In  many  other  leading  countries  laws  early 


were  passed  contemplating  and  providing  means  for  state 
purchase.  After  1833  every  concession  granted  in  France 
contained  a  provision  under  which  the  projected  road 
could  be  taken  over  by  the  government.  Prussia  enacted 
in  1838  that  the  state  might,  after  a  certain  time,  acquire 
and  operate  railways  whose  interest  it  guaranteed.  Even 
Great  Britain,  as  early  as  1844,  fixed  by  law  the  terms 
under  which  the  railroads  could  be  bought.  With  the 
specific  idea  of  state  acquisition  of  the  railways,  Switzer- 
land in  1851  provided  that  those  who  built  public  works 
under  legislation  by  the  Federation  should  be  bound  to 
cede  them  at  any  time  for  full  compensation.  When  the 
kingdom  of  Italy  in  1865  first  disposed  of  its  railways  to 
companies  it  kept  an  option  for  their  repurchase.  While 
in  the  United  States  practically  from  the  first  private 
ownership  and  management  was  considered  the  natural 
and  almost  inevitable  policy,  in  many  other  countries 
public  ownership  was  thus  regarded.  Where  a  certain 
policy  is  looked  on  as  natural  and  probable  it  is  more 
likely  to  be  adopted  than  where  the  opposite  is  the  case. 
Human  nature  inevitably  gravitates  toward  courses  of 
conduct  or  policy  that  are  deemed  natural  and  suitable, 
unless  something  occurs  to  check  the  tendency. 

Doubtless  the  cause  of  this  attitude  of  the  statesmen 
and  people  of  numerous  countries  was  that  they  had  been 
used  to  seeing  their  governments  take  an  active  and  lead- 
ing part  in  industrial  and  commercial  affairs,  either  by 
fostering  or  restrictive  regulation  or  by  carrying  on  com- 
mercial or  industrial  enterprises.  The  necessary  com- 
plement and  effect  of  active  participation  by  the  organ- 
ized people  through  their  government  in  industry  and 
commerce  is  limitation  of  the  industrial  and  commercial 
initiative  and  opportunities  of  individuals.  Therefore, 


we  find  that  in  many  of  the  countries  where  provision 
early  was  made  for  state  purchase  provision  also  was 
early  made  for  giving  state  subsidies  in  aid  of  railway 
construction. 

EFFECT  OF  THE  SUBSIDY  POLICY  IN  OTHElt  COUNTRIES. 

Although  most  of  the  railways  of  France  are  privately 
operated,  a  large  part  of  the  capital  for  their  develop- 
ment has  been  furnished  directly  or  indirectly  by  the 
state.  Likewise,  Prussia  and  the  other  German  states, 
Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  British  India,  and  many  other 
countries  have  aided  private  companies  by  guaranteeing 
their  securities.  In  the  early  railway  history  of  the 
United  States  subsidies  were  given  here,  but  most  of 
them  were  outright  donations.  The  land  grants  made 
became  absolute  when  the  mileage  on  whose  construction 
they  were  contingent  had  been  built.  Where  the  state  or 
local  governments  acquired  securities  they  usually  dis- 
posed of  them  soon  to  the  best  advantage  they  could.  The 
cash  advances  of  the  federal  government  to  the  companies 
that  built  the  Pacifies  were  after  a  long  time  practically 
all  paid  back.  In  other  words,  the  direct  financial  rela- 
tionships formed  between  the  railways  and  the  national, 
state  and  local  governments  in  the  United  States  were 
not  only  meant  to  be  temporary,  but  usually  were  soon 
entirely  terminated.  On  the  contrary,  many  European 
governments  assumed  and  retained  more  the  relation- 
ship of  the  holder  of  a  first  mortgage  so  large  that  it 
covered  a  great,  and  perhaps  a  preponderant,  share  of 
the  investment. 

The  result  in  the  United  States  was  that  when  the  rail- 
ways became  financially  embarrassed,  as  many  of  them 
did,  they  went  through  receiverships  which  left  them  in 


8 

% 

the  hands  of  the  private  capitalists  who  had  controlled 
them,  or  transferred  them  to  other  private  capitalists, 
while  the  subsidy  policy  of  Europe  has  in  many  cases 
had  a  direct  causal  connection  with  the  adoption  of  gov- 
ernment ownership.  It  was  largely  because  of  their  finan- 
cial embarrassments  and  because  the  state  was  one  of 
their  principal  creditors,  that  ten  small  companies  in 
France  were  taken  over  by  the  government  in  1877-78. 
It  was  mainly  because  its  debt  to  the  state  had  become 
very  great  that  the  Western  Eailway  of  France  was 
taken  over  about  thirty  years  later.  It  was  after  the 
panic  and  depression  of  1845-1848,  when  roads  for  which 
it  had  made  guarantees  of  interest  became  financially  em- 
barrassed, that  Prussia  acquired  a  number  of  small  roads 
and  began  operating  them. 

The  kingdom  of  Italy,  which  inherited  a  confused  net- 
work of  railroads  from  the  different  states  into  which 
the  country  had  been  divided,  sold  them  in  1865  to  four 
companies.  The  roads  were  unable  to  meet  their  obliga- 
tions to  the  state,  and  in  a  short  time  were  back  in  its 
hands.  After  another  trial  of  private  management  it  was 
again  chiefly  owing  to  financial  reasons  that  the  lines 
once  more  returned  to  the  state  in  1905.  In  Austria, 
also,  the  subsidy  policy  was  followed,  and  the  panic  of 
1873,  by  bankrupting  many  lines  and  throwing  them  on 
the  support  of  a  paternal  government,  marked  the  turn- 
ing point  in  Austrian  railway  policy.  Previously  the 
state  had  preferred  to  get  rid  of  its  own  railways  to  pri- 
vate capitalists. 


MANY  GOVERNMENTS  WERE  EARLY  RAILWAY  BUILDERS. 

The  beginning  of  government  ownership  in  Australia 
was  owing  to  a  cause  not  wholly  dissimilar.  It  was  due, 
not  to  want  of  private  enterprise,  but  to  the  fact  that  just 
when  the  need  for  railways  became  imperative  the  avail- 
able private  enterprise  and  capital  turned  to  gold  mining 
instead  of  to  railway  building.  In  India  the  British  gov- 
ernment became  a  builder,  owner  and  manager  of  rail- 
ways reluctantly.  If  they  were  to  be  adequately  provided 
it  must  be  by  the  government. 

Another  important  point  is  that  in  several  countries 
the  governments  were  themselves  among  the  first  railway 
builders.  When,  owing  to  any  cause,  a  government  al- 
ready has  railways,  especially  if  it  has  met  with  some 
success  with  them,  this  fact  creates  a  tendency  for  it  to 
acquire  those  of  private  companies.  King  Leopold  built 
the  first  railways  in  Belgium,  and  it  was  the  intolerable 
competition  of  the  private  with  the  state  lines  which 
many  years  later  caused  the  Belgian  government  to  begin 
acquiring  the  former.  In  Prussia  the  first  state  railway 
was  built  as  long  ago  as  1848.  The  various  Italian  states 
began  railway  construction  on  their  own  account  about 
the  same  time.  The  Austrian  and  Hungarian  govern- 
ments have  built  and  managed  railways  since  the  begin- 
ning of  railway  history.  The  first  railway  in  Japan  was 
built  by  the  state,  and  its  recent  acquisition  of  the  pri- 
vately-owned mileage  was  not"  a  revolutionary  change  of 
policy  but  simply  the  addition  of  the  relatively  large 
privately-owned  net  to  the  already  existing  state  lines. 


10 


POLITICAL  AND  MILITARY  MOTIVES. 

Political  and  military  motives  also  have  played  an  im- 
portant part.  In  Belgium  it  was  fear  of  the  hated  capi- 
talists of  Holland,  from  which  his  country  had  only  re- 
cently been  separated,  that  first  stimulated  King  Leopold 
to  begin  railway  construction.  One  of  the  most  effective 
arguments  used  for  the  adoption  of  government  owner- 
ship in  Switzerland  was  that  a  large  part  of  the  stock 
of  the  railways  was  owned  by  foreigners,  and  that  this 
involved  political  and  military  dangers  for  the  republic. 
State  purchase  was  urged  by  Bismarck  in  Germany  as  a 
means  of  binding  the  parts  of  the  new  empire  together 
and  making  the  entire  railway  system  available  for  mili- 
tary purposes  on  a  month's  notice.  Similar  motives,  and 
the  example  being  set  by  Germany,  stimulated  France  to 
acquire  the  several  small  railways  taken  over  in  1877-78, 
and  the  government  of  Austria  to  push  forward  a  policy 
of  state  acquisition.  Political  and  military  reasons  also 
at  about  the  same  time  influenced  Italy  to  acquire  from  the 
Austrian  government  and  Austrian  capitalists  their  stock 
in  the  railways  of  upper  Italy.  It  was  almost  solely  to 
bind  more  closely  together  the  French  and  English 
provinces  that  Canada  acquired  and  built  the  different 
parts  of  the  Intercolonial.  The  government  of  Mexico 
is  understood  to  have  bought  a  majority  of  the  stock  of 
the  railways  of  that  country  because  much  of  it  was 
owned  in  the  United  States,  and  it  was  understood  that 
some  American  railway  "  magnates "  were  seeking  to  get 
control  of  the  Mexican  lines  and  make  them  an  appen- 
dage of  one  or  more  of  the  large  systems  in  the  United 
States.  It  was  feared  this  might  cause  international  com- 
plications. 


11 

Strictly  economic  reasoning,  as  distinguished  from 
economic  conditions,  usually  lias  played  some  part  in 
bringing  about  state  ownership.  In  Switzerland  one  of 
the  effective  arguments  was  that  public  ownership  would 
lead  to  reductions  in  passenger  and  freight  rates  and  in- 
creases in  wages.  Bismarck  and  his  supporters  indi- 
cated that  after  state  acquisition  in  Germany  the  net 
earnings  of  the  railways  would  first  be  used  to  pay  in- 
terest and  to  liquidate  the  railway  debt,  after  which  the 
aim  would  be  barely  to  earn  working  expenses,  excess 
receipts  being  wiped  out  by  reductions  in  freight  and 
passenger  rates.  This  policy  has  not  been  carried  out. 
Capital  for  improvements  and  extensions  has  been  raised 
by  increases  in  the  debt.  Earnings  over  operating  ex- 
penses and  interest  requirements  have  been  used  to  pay 
current  expenses  of  the  governmnt. 

While,  however,  arguments  based  on  economic  grounds 
often  have  been  factors  in  bringing  about  government 
ownership  probably  in  very  few  countries  would  they 
alone  have  done  so.  Where  the  most  exhaustive  study 
of  the  question  from  an  economic  standpoint  was  made, 
viz.,  in  Italy,  the  decision  was  against  government  owner- 
ship. 

BEASONING  HEBE  MUST  BE  ON  ECONOMIC  GBOUNDS. 

Now,  there  are  no  laws  in  the  United  States  providing 
the  means  of  state  purchase.  There  do  not  exist  any 
financial  relations  between  the  railways  and  the  state 
and  national  governments  that  have  any  tendency  to  lead 
to  government  ownership.  There  are  no  state-owned 
railways  with  which  the  privately-owned  railways  com- 
pete, as  there  have  been  in  most  countries  where  govern- 
ment ownership  has  prevailed.  Not  enough  of  the  stock 


12 

and  bonds  of  our  railways  is  held  abroad  to  enable  for- 
eigners to  exercise  any  considerable  influence  over  their 
management.  There  is  no  necessity  for  the  public  to 
subsidize  or  engage  in  the  construction  of  railways  to 
provide  a  sufficient  mileage;  railway  development  under 
private  ownership  has  gone  on  faster  in  the  United 
States  than  in  any  other  country,  except,  in  recent  years, 
in  Canada.  There  is  no  political  condition  such  as  the 
need  for  binding  together  different  and  widely  separated 
sections  of  the  country  to  argue  for  public  ownership. 
There  is  no  need  for  the  central  government  to  have  abso- 
lute control  of  the  railways  for  military  reasons;  the 
United  States  is  not  surrounded,  as  is  each  of  the  coun- 
tries of  Europe,  with  nations  with  which  it  may  at  any 
time  be  plunged  into  war. 

So,  the  mere  fact  that  many  other  countries  have 
adopted  public  ownership  cannot  validly  be  advanced  as 
an  argument  for  that  policy  in  the  United  States,  because 
they  have  been  influenced  by  conditions  which  do  not 
exist  here,  and  by  reasoning  which  is  not  applicable  here. 
The  case  for  government  ownership  in  this  country,  if 
it  is  to  be  made  out,  must  be  based  entirely  on  economic 
grounds — a  thing  that  never  yet  has  been  successfully 
done  in  any  country. 

Will  the  cost  of  capital  be  less  under  government  than 
under  private  ownership  ?  "Would  public  management  be 
more  economical  and  efficient  than  private  management? 
Under  which  will  the  service  rendered  to  the  public  be 
the  better?  Under  which  will  rates  be  lower?  Under 
which  will  rates  be  fairer,  as  between  individuals,  classes, 
and  communities?  Under  which  will  the  financial  results 
be  better  on  the  whole  to  the  public?  Would  the  condi- 
tion of  railway  labor  be  better  under  government  than 


13 

under  private  management?  Would  government  owner- 
ship tend  to  improve  or  to  impair  our  political  morality? 
These  are  the  questions  to  be  considered.  And  the  burden 
of  proof  is  obviously  on  those  who  favor  public  owner- 
ship, not  on  those  who  oppose  it.  The  burden  is  on  them 
to  show  by  a  clear  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that 
the  change  would  be  beneficial.  Otherwise,  the  public 
would  not  be  justified  in  adopting  so  revolutionary  a  pol- 
icy. 

WHY   GERMAN   EXPERIENCE   IS   INAPPLICABLE. 

And  in  supporting  the  burden  of  proof  it  will  not  be 
enough  for  them  to  show,  if  they  can,  that  some  govern- 
ment railways  are  as  well  managed  as,  or  even  better 
managed  than,  ours.  Many  advocates  of  government 
ownership  say  that  Germany  has  benefited  by  that  policy, 
and  conclude  from  that  that  we  should  follow  Germany's 
example.  It  would  be  just  as  logical  to  say  that  Germany 
has  good  government  under  an  imperial  autocracy,  and 
that,  therefore,  we  should  have  an  imperial  autocracy. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  great  difference  between  Ger- 
many's form  of  government  and  ours  makes  any  argu- 
ment for  government  ownership  based  on  the  results  se- 
cured under  it  there  almost  wholly  inapplicable  here. 
Conceding  the  success  of  government  ownership  in  Ger- 
many, let  us  consider  the  form  of  their  railway  organiza- 
tion. 

The  Bundesrath,  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
various  states  forming  the  empire,  and  constituting  the 
upper  house  of  the  imperial  parliament,  has  general  su- 
pervision over  all  the  railways  of  the  German  Empire 
and  adopts  regulations  governing  their  operation.  Its 
executive  office  is  the  Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt.  The  presi- 


14 

dent  and  members  of  this  body  are  appointed  by  the  Em- 
peror, its  subordinate  officers  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
and  its  duty  is  to  see  that  all  imperial  laws  and  regu- 
lations regarding  railway  operation  are  carried  out,  and 
to  prepare  measures  affecting  railways  for  the  consid- 
eration of  the  Bundesrath.  It  conducts  its  business  un- 
der instructions  from,  and  on  the  responsibility  of,  the 
Chancellor.  This  outlines  the  organization  of  the  empire 
for  supervising  the  operation  of  the  entire  railway  sys- 
tem of  the  empire.  The  different  railways,  as  you  know, 
are,  in  the  main,  owned  by  the  different  states  composing 
the  empire.  The  most  important  of  these  state  systems 
is  the  Prussian-Hessian.  The  head  of  the  Prussian- 
Hessian  railway  administration  is  the  Prussian  Minis- 
ter of  Public  Works.  He  is  a  permanent  official,  ap- 
pointed by  the  Kaiser  and  he  has  large  powers  of  ad- 
ministration and  wide  authority  over  expenditures  within 
the  limits  of  the  yearly  estimates  sanctioned  by  Parlia- 
ment. Now,  the  members  of  the  Bundesrath,  which  acts 
as  a  kind  of  board  of  directors  for  all  of  the  railways 
in  the  Empire,  are  appointed  by  the  kings  of  the  vari- 
ous German  states,  and  constitute  a  body  of  ambassadors 
more  than  a  legislative  body,  and  they  and  their  execu- 
tive arm,  the  Eeichs-Eisenbahn-Amt,  live  in  no  fear  of 
the  electorate,  which  cannot  control  them,  and  are  prac- 
tically independent  of  public  opinion.  Likewise,  the  min- 
isters of  railways,  including  especially  that  of  the  largest 
system — the  Prussian-Hessian — being  permanent  officers 
appointed  by  the  kings  of  the  various  states,  are  inde- 
pendent of  the  voters  and  lawmakers  and  of  public 
opinion. 

The  employes  are  not  permitted  to  form  labor  unions, 
and,  indeed,  are  entirely  helpless  to  get  anything  from 


15 

the  railway  administration  that  it  does  not  want  to  give. 
Discipline  is  enforced  with  military  rigor. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  have  a  government  railway 
organization  in  this  country  anything  like  that  in  Ger- 
many; and  this  being  so  there  is  no  good  ground  for 
arguing  that  we  would  get  as  good  results  under  public 
ownership  as  the  Germans  do.  As  one  of  the  great  citi- 
zens of  this  state,  Charles  Francis  Adams,  said  thirty 
years  ago,  "In  applying  results  drawn  from  the  experi- 
ence of  one  country  to  problems  which  present  them- 
selves in  another,  the  difference  of  social  and  political 
habit  and  education  should  ever  be  borne  in  mind.  Be- 
cause in  the  countries  of  continental  Europe  the  state 
can  and  does  hold  close  relations,  amounting  even  to 
ownership,  with  the  railroads,  it  does  not  follow  that 
the  same  course  could  be  successfully  pursued  in  England 
and  America.  The  former  nations  are  by  political  habit 
administrative,  the  latter  are  parliamentary. 
Now,  the  executive  may  design,  construct  or  operate  a 
railroad;  the  legislative  never  can.  A  country,  there- 
fore, with  a  weak  or  unstable  executive,  or  a  crude  and 
imperfect  civil  service,  should  accept  with  caution  results 
achieved  under  a  government  of  bureaus."  And  as  W. 
M.  Acworth  has  said,  "Prussia  is  Prussia,  with  a  gov- 
ernment in  effect  autocratic,  with  a  civil  service  with  a 
strong  esprit  de  corps,  and  permeated  with  old  tradi- 
tions, leading  them  to  regard  themselves  as  servants  of 
the  king,  rather  than  as  candidates  for  popular  favor. 
I  am  inclined  to  think, "  Mr.  Acworth  adds,  "that  the 
effect  of  the  evidence  is  that  the  further  a  government 
departs  from  autocracy  and  develops  in  the  direction 
of  democracy  the  less  successful  it  is  likely  to  be  in  the 
direct  management  of  railroads. "  This  statement  of  Mr. 


16 

Acworth's  is  not  absolutely  accurate,  but  it  is  approxi- 
mately so.  It  is  certain  that  there  are  no  publicly  owned 
railways  in  countries  having  democratic  governments 
that  approach  in  efficiency  of  management  the  state  rail- 
ways of  Germany. 

EFFICIENCY  OF  PRUSSIAN  VS.  UNITED  STATES  RAILWAYS. 

Nor  is  it  necessary  to  concede,  in  recognizing  that  the 
German  roads  are  well  managed,  that  they  are  better  or 
as  well  managed  as  ours  are  under  private  ownership. 
The  average  freight  trainload  on  our  railways  in  1909  was 
363  tons,  and  on  the  railroads  of  Prussia-Hesse  it  was 
only  233  tons,  although  their  density  of  freight  traffic  is 
as  great  as  ours.  The  wages  of  labor  here  are 
almost  three  times  what  they  are  in  Germany; 
but  we  handle  100  per  cent,  as  much  freight 
traffic  per  mile  as  they  do  and  25  per  cent,  as 
much  passenger  traffic  with  less  than  50  per  cent, 
as  large  operating  expenses,  only  a  little  over  50 
per  cent,  as  high  cost  of  road  and  equipment  and  only 
a  little  over  50  per  cent,  as  large  net  earnings  per  mile. 
Their  average  passenger  rate  is  lower  than  ours;  but 
our  average  freight  rate  is  much  lower  than  theirs.  The 
earnings  of  our  railways  from  passenger  and  freight 
traffic  in  1910  averaged  $10,769.48  per  mile.  If  we  had  ap- 
plied the  Prussian  passenger  rate  to  our  passenger  traf- 
fic, and  the  Prussian  freight  rate  to  our  freight  traffic, 
the  earnings  of  our  railways  from  passengers  and  freight 
would  have  been  increased  by  $3,810.78  per  mile,  or  to 
$14,580.26  per  mile.  The  application  of  the  Prussian- 
Hessian  passenger  and  freight  rates  to  the  traffic  of  the 
railways  in  our  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  Group 


17 

II  would  increase  the  earnings  per  mile  by  about 
$12,500  per  mile.  And  bear  in  mind  that  the  higher 
rates  that  are  charged  in  Prussia-Hesse  are  charged  in 
a  country  where  the  wages,  both  of  labor  in  general  and 
of  railway  labor  in  particular  are  about  one-third  as  high 
as  they  are  here.  I  do  not  think  that  anyone  can  intelli- 
gently and  candidly  study  the  figures  without  conclud- 
ing that  our  railways  are  more  efficiently  managed  in 
the  interest  of  the  public  itself  than  those  of  Prussia- 
Hesse  ;  and  the  Prussian-Hessian  lines  are  beyond  ques- 
tion the  best  managed  state  owned  railways  in  the  world. 

EFFICIENT    PUBLIC    MANAGEMENT    BEQUIBES    EFFICIENT 

GOVERNMENT. 

The  vital  prerequisite  to  efficient  management  of  gov- 
ernment railway  is,  of  course,  efficient  government.  Gov- 
ernment railway  management  cannot  rise  higher  than  its 
source.  Germany  has  efficient  state  railways  because  she 
has  a  government  which  you  must  concede  to  be  efficient, 
whatever  else  you  may  say  about  it.  No  one  would  say 
that  our  governments,  either  national  or  state,  have  been 
efficient  in  the  past.  Are  we  moving  toward  efficiency? 

Intelligent  and  thoughtful  men  differ  about  the  extent 
to  which  government  regulation  of  business  should  be 
carried.  They  agree,  however,  that  under  existing  con- 
ditions some  regulation  of  the  transportation  and  other 
large  industries  is  necessary.  Much  legislation  for  the 
regulation  of  railways  has  been  enacted.  There  is  a  con- 
siderable popular  demand  for  similar  regulation  of  big 
industrial  concerns ;  and  some  laws  for  this  purpose  have 
been  passed. 

These  economic  and  social  problems,  involving  the  re- 
lations of  large  business  concerns  to  the  public,  that  the 


18 

governments  are  beginning  to  grapple  with,  are  more 
hard  and  complex  than  any  they  have  heretofore  encoun- 
tered. It  is  essential  to  their  righteous  and  beneficial 
solution  that  the  laws  regarding  them  shall  be  drafted 
and  administered  by  men  having  enough  expert  knowl- 
edge of  the  subjects  to  which  they  pertain  to  know  what 
it  is  right  to  do,  and  enough  ability  and  courage  to  do 
what  they  know  to  foe  right.  It  cannot  be  said  that  legis- 
lation for  the  regulation  of  industry  always,  or  even  usu- 
ally, has  in  the  past  in  this  country  been  drafted,  en- 
acted and  administered  by  such  men.  For  example,  our 
laws  for  the  regulation  of  railways  often  have  been  so  un- 
reasonable as  to  harm  both  the  railways  and  the  public, 
and  to  be  held  unconstitutional  by  the  courts.  Similarly, 
our  railway  commissions,  especially  those  of  the  states, 
commonly  have  been  composed  of  persons  chosen  purely 
for  political  reasons  and  having  no  special  fitness  for 
their  duties.  Their  general  policies  and  specific  acts, 
therefore,  usually  have  been  neither  as  wise  nor  of  as 
much  benefit  as  they  should  have  been.  Our  insurance 
laws,  likewise,  have  commonly  been  defective;  and  our 
insurance  commissioners  usually  have  not  been  insur- 
ance experts,  but  political  experts.  Similarly,  there  is  a 
widespread  opinion  that  our  laws  for  the  regulation  of 
large  industrial  and  labor  combinations,  particularly  the 
.Sherman  Anti-trust  Act,  have  not  been  drawn  with  knowl- 
edge and  wisdom  or  executed  with  impartiality  or  skill. 
The  bankers,  likewise,  complain  that  our  currency  laws 
are  extremely  defective  and  are  vigorously  agitating 
for  their  amendment.  Officers  of  both  the  industrial  con- 
cerns and  the  railways  complain,  and  I  believe  truly,  that 
they  could  not  do  business  under  the  Sherman  law  if  it 
were  rigorously  enforced;  and  the  bankers  complain— 


19 

and  every  one  knows  their  complaint  is  justified — that  in 
times  of  financial  panic  they  have  to  hold  on  to  the 
money  of  depositors  and  issue  clearing  house  certificates 
in  open  violation  of  law,  simply  because  if  they  obeyed 
existing  laws  the  industry  ancl  commerce  of  the  country 
would  be  plunged  into  universal  bankruptcy.  Could  any- 
thing be  more  disgraceful  to  a  nation  than  to  enact  and 
keep  in  effect  laws  for  the  regulation  of  business  which 
business  men  must  needs  break  in  order  to  do  business 
in  a  way  that  the  welfare  of  the  country  requires? 

ABE  WE  MOVING  TOWARD  EFFICIENCY  IN  GOVERNMENT? 

Now  that  we  are  embarking  on  a  much  more  extensive 
scheme  of  regulation  of  industry  is  there  going  to  be  an 
improvement  in  this  regard?  Some  encouragement  is 
afforded  by  the  fact  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  becoming  a  more  expert  body  and  that  some 
of  the  state  railway  commissions  are  showing  them- 
selves superior  in  ability,  courage  and  fairness  to  most 
such  bodies  in  the  past. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  tendency  in  our  public 
affairs  that  discourages  the  idea  that  our  governments 
are  to  grow  more  expert.  This  tendency  is  illustrated 
by  the  change  within  recent  years  in  the  attitude  of 
public  men  generally  toward  their  constituents — a  change 
of  the  first  importance  and  significance,  but  on  which 
I  have  seen  little  comment.  Formerly  it  was  thought 
that  the  statesman,  whether  a  member  of  a  state  legis- 
lature, or  of  Congress,  or  the  governor  of  a  state,  or 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  should  be  a  leader 
of  public  opinion;  that  he  should  appear  before  the 
people,  give  to  them  his  views  on  public  questions,  advo- 
cate the  policies  he  believed  to  be  right  and  expedient, 


20 

and  stand  or  fall  according  to  whether  the  public,  after 
hearing  him,  did  or  did  not  agree  with  him.  It  was 
understood  to  be  his  duty  after  being  elected  to  do  what 
he  considered  to  be  right  and  in  the  public  interest, 
even  though  public  opinion  at  the  time  might  not  agree 
with  him.  As  Macaulay  once  said  in  a  letter  to  his  con- 
stituents : 

"The  great  beauty  of  the  representative  system  is, 
that  it  unites  the  advantages  of  popular  control  with 
the  advantages  arising  from  a  division  of  labor.  Just 
as  a  physician  understands  medicine  better  than  an 
ordinary  man,  just  as  a  shoemaker  makes  better  shoes 
than  an  ordinary  person,  so  a  person  whose  life  is 
passed  in  transacting  affairs  of  state  becomes  a  bet- 
ter statesman  than  an  ordinary  man.  In  politics,  as 
well  as  every  other  department  of  life,  the  public 
ought  to  have  the  means  of  checking  those  who  serve 
it.  If  a  man  finds  that  he  derives  no  benefit  from 
the  prescription  of  his  physician  he  calls  in  another. 
If  his  shoes  do  not  fit  him  he  changes  his  shoe- 
maker. But  when  he  has  called  in  a  physician  of 
whom  he  hears  a  good  report,  and  whose  general  prac- 
tice he  believes  to  be  judicious,  it  would  be  absurd 
in  him  to  tie  down  that  physician  to  order  particular 
pills  and  particular  draughts.  While  he  continued 
to  be  a  customer  of  the  shoemaker  it  would  be  absurd 
in  him  to  sit  by  and  mete  every  motion  of  that  shoe- 
maker's hand.  My  opinion  is  that  electors 
ought  at  first  to  choose  cautiously;  then  to  confide  lib- 
erally; and  when  the  term  for  which  they  have  se- 
lected their  member  has  expired,  to  review  his  con- 
duct equitably  and  to  pronounce  on  the  whole  taken 
together." 

Today,  on  the  other  hand,  we  hear  preached  everywhere 
the  doctrine  that  the  duty  of  public  men  is  to  fall  in 
behind  the  ephemeral  public  opinion  of  their  counties, 
or  congressional  districts,  or  states,  to  march  with  it 
wherever  it  may  be  going,  and  to  advocate  and  help  pass 
whatever  laws  the  public  may  demand,  whether  in  their 


21 

own  judgment  the  legislation  demanded  is  equitable  or 
inequitable,  for  the  public  interest  or  against  it.  From 
public  men  who  are  thus  wanting  in  convictions,  or  in 
the  courage  of  them,  of  whom  there  are  many,  the  pub- 
lic does  not  get  the  benefit  of  the  brave  and  wise  counsel 
and  intelligent  action  which  it  is  entitled  to  receive. 

At  a  time  when  so  many  public  men  are  not  leaders,  but 
avowed  time  servers  and  camp  followers  of  public  opinion, 
measures  are  being  adopted  in  some  states  and  advocated 
in  others  which  are  designed  to  make  the  enactment,  ad- 
ministration, interpretation  and  application  of  our  laws 
reflect  even  more  perfectly  every  passing  wave  and  whim 
of  public  sentiment.  I  refer  to  the  legislation  for  the 
initiative,  referendum  and  recall.  The  purpose  of  the  in- 
itiative is  to  enable  a  small  part  of  the  voters,  usually 
five  to  eight  per  cent.,  to  submit  any  measure,  however 
trivial  or  however  complex  the  subject  it  deals  with,  to 
popular  vote.  Under  the  referendum,  any  measure  passed 
by  the  legislature  may  be  compelled,  by  petition  of  a  small 
percentage  of  the  voters,  to  be  submitted  to  popular  vote. 
Under  the  recall  the  question  of  removing  from  office  any 
elective  official,  including  judges,  may  on  petition  of  a 
small  percentage  of  the  voters  be  submitted  to  popular 
determination ;  and  he  may  actually  be  recalled  by  a  very 
much  smaller  vote  than  that  which  elected  him. 

TENDING  TOWARD  LESS  EFFICIENT  GOVERNMENT. 

The  men  at  this  dinner  are  American  citizens  of  more 
than  average  intelligence.  Each  of  us  knows,  however, 
that  he  is  incapable  of  forming  such  an  intelligent  opin- 
ion regarding  each  of  the  great  and  complex  problems 
relating  to  the  regulation  of  business — the  tariff  problem, 
the  currency  problem,  the  trust  problem,  the  railway  prob- 


22 

lem,  and  so  on — as  would  enable  him  to  cast  a  wise  vote  on 
measures  relating  to  each  of  these  subjects  or  on  a  prop- 
osition to  recall  a  judge  who  had  rendered  a  decision  in- 
terpreting or  holding  unconstitutional  a  statute  pertain- 
ing to  one  of  them.  We  are  all  more  or  less  familiar 
with  railway  affairs,  and,  therefore,  we  can,  perhaps,  form 
a  fairly  intelligent  opinion  about  regulation  of  railways ; 
but  most  of  us  would  at  once  admit  that  we  would  rather 
trust  their  solution  to  expert  lawmakers  and  adminis- 
trators in  whom  we  have  confidence  than  to  attempt  their 
solution  ourselves.  But  under  this  new  scheme  of  gov- 
ernment the  people  are  not  to  leave  to  experts  or  those 
capable  of  becoming  experts  the  solution  of  these  great 
problems,  but  they  are  to  try  directly  to  solve  them 
themselves;  and  if  in  doing  so  they  pass  laws  that  any 
official  does  not  administer  or  any  judge  does  not  con- 
strue and  apply  exactly  to  suit,  not  a  majority  of  the  vot- 
ers, but  a  majority  of  those  who  happen  to  vote  at  the 
recall  election,  that  official  or  judge  is  to  "get  the  hook," 
as  it  is  given  to  fledgling  actors  on  amateur  night  at  some 
theaters,  and  be  yanked  from  his  office  or  from  the  bench. 
Courts  have  been  established  to  interpret  and  apply  the 
laws  because  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  people  in  the 
mass  are  incapable  of  doing  so,  and  able  lawyers  are 
elected  to  the  bench  because  it  is  assumed  that  they  will 
be  most  competent  to  say  what  is  the  law.  But  under  this 
new  regime  if  a  judge  who  knows  the  law  differs  regard- 
ing what  it  is  from  us,  the  people,  who  do  not  know  it, 
we,  the  people,  are  to  put  our  ignorance  above  his  knowl- 
edge and  drag  him  from  his  high  seat  in  disgrace. 

Is  it  to  be  expected  that  under  any  such  scheme  of  gov- 
ernment the  laws  passed  to  deal  with  complicated  and 
difficult  questions  involving  the  proper  relations  of  busi- 


23 

ness  and  government  will  be  wisely  adapted  to  conditions, 
that  their  administration  will  be  firm  but  intelligent  and 
fair,  and  that  their  interpretation  and  application  by 
the  courts  will  be  wise,  impartial  and  courageous?  The 
purpose  of  such  legislation,  as  I  have  said,  is  to  give  effect 
to  every  ephemeral  whim  of  popular  sentiment  or  passion ; 
and  it  is  adapted  to  its  purpose.  Now,  if  men  and  women 
individually  acted  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  every 
transitory  impulse  or  passing  gust  of  passion  there  would 
be  no  wise,  or  virtuous,  or  honest  men  or  women  in 
the  world.  And  if  the  people  of  this  country  were  to 
act  in  the  same  way  there  would  not  and  could  not  be 
any  wise,  or  virtuous,  or  honest  legislation  for  the  regu- 
lation or  management  of  business. 

You  may  say  that  no  one  would  be  so  foolish  as  to 
suggest  submitting  to  popular  vote  highly  technical  and 
complex  questions  regarding  the  regulation  or  public  man- 
agement of  business.  I  answer  that  in  Oregon  at  the 
last  election  there  were  submitted  on  a  referendum  ballot 
37  distinct  measures,  in  a  pamphlet  containing  256  pages 
of  small  type;  and  that  among  them  was  a  railway  bill 
having  this  remarkable  title:  "An  Act  Entitled  'An  Act 
to  provide  for  a  uniform  percentage  in  the  relationship 
of  the  classification  ratings,  providing  for  the  establish- 
ment of  minimum  carload  weights,  to  fix  the  maximum 
rate  on  basis  of  the  less  than  carloal  rate  of  the  article 
and  the  minimum  carload  weight  that  may  be  charged  on 
carload  shipments  of  property,  defining  the  rating  upon 
which  the  carload  rate  shall  be  computed,  and  prescribing 
penalties  for  violations  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act.'  " 
This  measure  was  adopted,  because,  while  nobody  knew 
what  it  meant,  the  voters  hoped  it  might  mean  a  reduction 
in  railway  rates.  Is  that  any  way  to  get  an  intelligent, 


24 

deliberate  expression  of  public  opinion  on  any  subject 
of  public  importance?  Is  it,  in  particular,  any  way  to 
secure  expert  action  on  the  enormously  difficult  and  in- 
tricate questions  pertaining  to  the  regulation  or  man- 
agement of  transportation  and  industry  I 

THE  NEED  FOB  MORE  EXPERT  ADMINSTRATION  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 

What  we  need  in  this  country  is  not,  as  many  people 
seem  to  think,  more  "direct"  government,  which  is  but 
another  way  of  saying  more  ignorant  and  inexpert  gov- 
ernment; but  what  we  need  is  more  government  under 
which  legislation  will  be  drafted  by  able,  courageous 
statesmen  and  enforced  by  wise,  trained,  expert,  expert 
enced  administrators.  The  need  for  that  kind  of  gov- 
ernment would  be  much  more  vital  if  we  should  embark 
on  a  policy  of  state  socialism;  and  we  are  not  moving 
toward  that  kind  of  government,  but  in  exactly  the  op- 
posite direction.  I  cannot  conceive  of  anything  that 
would  lead  to  more  deplorable  results  for  travelers,  for 
shippers  and  for  the  taxpaying  public  than  government 
management  of  railways  officered  not  by  experts  but  by 
politicians,  manned  by  labor  brotherhoods  having  an  enor- 
mous voting  power,  and  directed  by  referendum ;  and  that, 
from  present  indications,  is  what  government  ownership 
in  this  country  would  mean.  Germany  has  been  success- 
ful in  the  operation  of  state  railways  to  the  extent  that 
she  has  been  for  the  same  reason  that  she  has  been  so 
successful  in  developing  and  maintaining  her  army  and 
navy  and  her  system  of  vocational  education,  viz.,  that 
she  has  put  expertness  and  efficiency  in  public  affairs 
above  every  other  consideration.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  have  amply  demonstrated  their  capacity  for  gov- 


25 

erning  themselves;  but  they  are  very  far  from  having 
proved  their  capacity  to  efficiently  govern  themselves; 
and  until  they  begin  to  move  in  that  direction  to  ad- 
vocate taking  further  steps  in  the  direction  of  state  social- 
ism is  a  certain  indication  of  ignorance  or  recklessness 
or  both.  I  am  not  opposed  to  public  ownership 
and  management  of  railways  or  any  other  industry 
simply  as  a  matter  of  abstract  principle.  The  question 
involved  is  not  one  of  abstract  principle  at  all.  It  is  one 
of  practical  public  expediency ;  and  as  a  matter  of  prac- 
tical public  expediency  the  desirability  of  taking  the  op- 
eration of  our  railways  out  of  the  hands  of  managements 
that  compare  well  in  efficiency  with  any  other  railway 
managements  in  the  world,  and  turning  it  over  to  a  gov- 
ernment or  governments  that  in  efficiency  compare  ill 
with  the  governments  of  several  other  leading  countries 
certainly  seems  extremely  doubtful.  When  a  man  advo- 
cates government  ownership  of  railways  in  this  country 
we  may  well  ask  what  he  proposes  to  do  before  that 
policy  is  adopted  to  so  increase  the  efficiency  of  our  gov- 
ernment as  to  make  it  fit  to  undertake  railway  manage- 
ment. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN     INITIAL     FINE     OF    25     CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


MAR  31  1933 
FEB   o 


jOOec'«a» 
»i-D 


LD  21-50m-l,'3J 


GAYLORD    BROS. 


\ 


r~ 


